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In Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co.,1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court upheld an order of summary judgment denying
recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising
from an alleged retaliatory discharge from employment. The
court found "a total lack of evidence concerning the alleged re-
taliatory nature of such termination, ' 2 and no evidence that the
employer "acted in an outrageous manner."3
Plaintiff, an at-will employee of the copper roller division of
the Zenith Engraving Company, sustained two work-related
back injuries, and as a result of the second injury was continu-
ously absent from work from November 1976 through October
1977. Although he received temporary total disability benefits
during this period, he also applied for permanent disability com-
pensation. On October 20, 1977, Zenith terminated plaintiff's
employment for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff had shown
neither any intent to return to work nor the physical ability to
do so; and (2) plaintiff's job position no longer existed.4 Follow-
ing plaintiff's discharge, Zenith settled his permanent physical
disability claim for $18,000. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit
seeking damages for mental distress,5 alleging his discharge was
in retaliation for his seeking workmen's compensation benefits.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress re-
sults in liability when defendant's "conduct has been so outra-
1. - S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). See Contracts, Annual Survey of South Caro-
lina Law, 32 S.C.L. REV. 49, 55 (1980).
2. Id. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 814.
3. Id.
4. Id. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 813. The copper roller division had been discontinued.
5. One is liable for the tort of mental distress if he "by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another .... .
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). See Bellamy v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 269 S.C. 578, 239 S.E.2d 73 (1977); Rhodes v. Security Fin. Corp., 268 S.C.
300, 233 S.E.2d 105 (1977); Turner v. A B C Jalousie Co., 251 S.C. 92, 160 S.E.2d 528
(1968). For a case in which an abusive discharge of an at-will employee was held actiona-
ble as intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371
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geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' At trial, plaintiff
argued that his malicious and intentional discharge by Zenith in
retaliation for his pursuit of compensation benefits constituted
the requisite outrageous conduct. The supreme court, however,
concluded that there was no evidence that plaintiff had been
subjected to "rude or hostile" treatment by Zenith. Further, the
court found no evidence that plaintiff had been discharged in
retaliation for seeking benefits or that any Zenith employee had
acted outrageously toward plaintiff.8 The court, therefore, af-
firmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in
favor of defendant. The court also determined that Zenith had
not violated plaintiff's contractual rights by discharging him."
Plaintiff was an at-will employee and, accordingly, he could quit
or be discharged at any time for any reason or for no reason at
all.10 Since it found no evidence of retaliatory discharge, the
court did not decide whether an employee's allegations of "retal-
iatory discharge" stated an independent claim for which relief
could be granted.1
Other courts ruling on this issue have reached conflicting re-
sults, 12 but employees generally have recovered in the most re-
6. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 814 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
46(1), Comment d (1965)).
7. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 814.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. South Carolina has followed the general rule in a case factually similar to Hud-
son. Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950). See note 16 and
accompanying text infra.
11. In dismissing the complaint of a terminated at-will employee who alleged that
defendant employers had conspired to have him discharged, the supreme court stated
that "the South Carolina cases recognizing a cause of action for tortious interference
with a contract have been limited to situations where an action was brought against third
persons rather than parties to the contract." Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., - S.C. -, -'
259 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1979).
12. Cases in which "retaliatory discharge" has been held actionable include: Raden
v. City of Azusa, 97 Cal. App. 3d 336, 158 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,
74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 InI. App. 2d 1022,
366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Brown v.
Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.36 (Supp. 1979).
Cases in which "retaliatory discharge" has been held not actionable include: Loucks
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cent cases.' 3 One of the first courts to address this issue was the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Raley v. Darling Shop, Inc.1
4
While plaintiff in that case was hospitalized for a work-related
injury, an agent of the employer visited her and threatened her
with discharge if she did not withdraw her claim from the Indus-
trial Commission. Plaintiff resisted these threats and subse-
quently was discharged. The court concluded that the em-
ployer's conduct, however reprehensible, did not constitute a
tortious invasion of plaintiff's rights because she refused, in re-
sponse to the threats, to withdraw her claim before the
Commission.
15
Courts denying recovery have generally done so on two
grounds. The first is the general rule that an at-will employment
contract may be terminated at any time by any party with or
without cause or justification.' "This is true whether the dis-
charge by the employer was malicious or done for other im-
proper reasons.' 7 For example, in Loucks v. Star City Glass
Co.,'1 plaintiff argued that while his contract of employment was
v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977)(Loucks interpreted Illinois law, and,
although not expressly overruled, is no longer law in Illinois after the supreme court
recognized the tort in Kelsay); Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Stephens v.
Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six
Express, 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961); Christy v. Petrus, 356 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122
(1956); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978); Raley v.
Darling Shop, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950). Professor Larson states that
Christy and Narens can be explained partly by the existence in Missouri of an express
criminal penalty for retaliatory discharge. The Missouri court stated that the existence
of such a criminal penalty implied the exclusion of a civil remedy. 2A A. LARsoN, supra,
at 63 (Supp. 1979). See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 979 (1975); 81 AM. JUR. 2d Work-
men's Compensation § 55 (1976).
13. See cases cited note 12 supra.
14. 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
15. Id. at 538, 59 S.E.2d at 149.
16. This rule has been recognized in South Carolina at least since Shealy v. Fowler,
182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936). See Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., - S.C. -, 259 S.E.2d
815 (1979); Gainey v. Coker's Pedigreed Seed Co., 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486 (1955);
Orsini v. Trojan Steel Co., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951); Parker v. Southeastern
Haulers, Inc., 210 S.C. 18, 41 S.E.2d 387 (1947). See also 9 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §
1017 (3d ed. 1967); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975). If no time is specified and no consid-
eration is given, the contract will be interpreted as one of employment only for as long as
either party wishes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442, Comment a (1958). See
generally 3A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1960); 53 Am. JUR. 2d Master and
Servant § 43 (1970).
o 17. Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708, 709 (Ala. 1978).
18. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
3
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terminable at will, it was not terminable at will for a retaliatory
reason. The court disagreed with this contention, stating that
"[a] court may be sympathetic to hardship inflicted on a dis-
charged employee and unsympathetic to 'bad' reasons motivat-
ing discharge but it is not the judicial business to rewrite a frag-
ile employment contract to which the parties have agreed." '19
The second general ground for denial is that it is the role of
the legislature, not the courts, to provide for a retaliatory dis-
charge cause of action. The absence of a provision in the Work-
men's Compensation Act creating a private cause of action has
been viewed as a deliberate policy decision of the legislature.2 °
Thus, in Christy v. Petrus,21 the court concluded that the legis-
lature's careful specification of the rights and liabilities of em-
ployees and employers without providing for retaliatory dis-
charge evidenced a lack of intent to create such a right.2 2 The
Court of Appeals of North Carolina, in Dockery v. Lampart Ta-
ble Co.,23 summarized the policy and legal arguments against
recognizing a tort cause of action for retaliatory discharge. First,
such recognition is not consistent with the common-law rule
concerning the rights and liabilities of at-will employees to quit
or be discharged.24 Second, "remedies for claims resulting from
alleged violations of the spirit of the act are best left to the legis-
lature. ' '2' Third, the legislature's failure to provide for a tort of
retaliatory discharge was evidence of its intent that no such
claim be created.20 The dissent in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,27
also pointed out that by adopting a cause of action for retalia-
tory discharge, the court transformed the normal employment
19. Id. at 747.
20. See Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Dockery v. Lampart
Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978). See note 22 infra.
21. 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956).
22. Id. at 1193, 295 S.W.2d at 126. Similarly, in Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36
N.C. App. 293, 297, 244 S.E.2d 272, 275 (1978), the court said, "[i]f the General Assem-
bly of North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created, surely, in a workmen's
compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would have specifically addressed the
problem."
23. 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978).
24. Id. at 297, 244 S.E.2d at 275.
25. Id. at 299, 244 S.E.2d at 276.
26. Id. at 300, 244 S.E.2d at 276-77. The court pointed out that the legislature had
provided tort remedies for employees discharged for engaging in union activities. Id. at
300, 244 S.E.2d at 277.
27. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
[Vol. 32224
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contract, terminable at the will of either party, into tenured em-
ployment for every employee who files a workmen's compensa-
tion claim.2
The Indiana Supreme Court, in Frampton v. Central Ind.
Gas Co., 29 was the first court to hold that a former employee
could recover on a theory of retaliatory discharge.30 In
Frampton, the court, noting the established principle that work-
men's compensation acts should be construed liberally in favor
of employees, stated that an employee must be able to assert his
rights under the Act without fear of reprisal if the goals and
public policies of the Act are to be effectuated fully.3 1 The Indi-
ana Act, embracing well-defined and well-established public pol-
icy, required strict employer adherence in the following provi-
sion: "No contract or agreement, written or implied, no rule,
regulation or other device shall, in any manner, operate to re-
lieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created
by this act."'3 2 The court believed that the threat of retaliatory
discharge contravened public policy within the meaning of the
statute. Having no case-law precedent to follow, the court analo-
gized to cases concerning retaliatory eviction of tenants for re-
28. Id. at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1977)). The
dissent also pointed out that
[h]enceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an employee
may be, if he has filed a compensation claim against an employer, that em-
ployer may thereafter discharge him only at the risk of being compelled to
defend a suit for retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive damages, which
could well severely impair or destroy the solvency of small businesses.
74 Ill. 2d at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
29. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
30. Professor Larson states, "[ilt is odd that such a decision was so long in coming.
Perhaps the explanation may lie in the fact that the conduct involved is so contemptible
that few modern employers would be willing to risk the opprobrium of being found in
such a posture." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 12, at 63.
31. 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
32. Id. at 252, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15 (Burns
1974)). A virtually identical provision appears in the South Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act: "No contract or agreement, written or implied, and no rule, regulation or
other device shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of
any obligation created by this Title except as otherwise expressly provided in this Title."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-610 (1976). Contra, Greenwood v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
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porting health and safety code violations.33
Several courts have held for employees when an employer
arbitrarily discharged an employee because he exercised a statu-
tory right or when the dismissal was contrary to public policy.34
In Brown v. Transcon Lines,3 5 the Oregon Supreme Court thus
recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge, following the rule of
33. 260 Ind. at 252-53, 297 N.E.2d at 428. The court cited Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969), in which the court allowed
retaliatory eviction as a defense to a landlord's action for possession, and Aweeka v.
Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971), in which a California court allowed
retaliatory eviction as the basis for an affirmative cause of action. For an analysis of
other possible analogies supporting the Frampton decision, see Lambert, Workmen's
Compensation, 35 Am. TRIAL LAW. A.L.J. 150 (1974). The court in Dockery distinguished
Frampton, pointing out that the North Carolina courts have expressly rejected the use of
retaliatory eviction as a defense by a tenant. 36 N.C. App. at 295-96, 244 S.E.2d at 274-
75.
34. The South Carolina Supreme Court arguably has recognized the public policy
exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine. In Branham v. Miller Elec. Co., 237 S.C.
540, 545, 118 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1961), the court found for an at-will employee discharged
in violation of the spirit of the right to work law, and stated, "[fireedom of contract is
subordinate to public policy. . .." In Hudson, the court stated that "[c]ourts in a mi-
nority of jurisdictions, however, have recognized in decisions made subsequent to Raley
an exception to the general rule when there has been a violation of public policy." -
S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at 813. The court cited Frampton; Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536
P.2d 512 (1975)(employee discharged for accepting jury duty); and Petermann v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1955)(termination for
refusal to commit perjury), but commented that even if this exception were to be recog-
nized it would not avail Hudson because he had alleged mental distress and not breach
of or tortious interference with his employment contract. - S.C. at -, 259 S.E.2d at
813-14. See Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1961)(employee discharged for promoting unionism); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974)(employee discharged for refusing foreman's sex-
ual advances); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978)(em-
ployee discharged as a result of his efforts to have employer bank comply with state and
federal consumer credit protection laws); Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. Ray. 1404
(1967); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
Further, in Sventko v. Kroger Co., the court stated,
It is too well-settled to require citation that an employer at will may not sud-
denly terminate the employment of persons because of their sex, race, or relig-
ion. Likewise, the better view is that an employer at will is not free to dis-
charge an employee when the reason for the discharge is an intention on the
part of the employer to contravene the public policy of this state.
69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976). But see Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), in which the discharge was held not ac-
tionable because the employer did not violate any clear mandate of public policy.
35. 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
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Nees v. Hocks.3 6 Nees concerned an employee who was dis-
charged for going on jury duty contrary to the direction of her
employer. In finding for the employee, the court stated that
there are situations in which a discharge is for such a "socially
undesirable motive" that the employer is liable in damages.
3 7
The court in Brown stated that discharging an employee for
seeking benefits constituted such a "socially undesirable" mo-
tive.38 Similarly, in Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co.,39 an Illinois
court stated that, although it recognized an employer's interest
in having the freedom to discharge at-will employees, this inter-
est was outweighed by the strong public interest in providing
financial and medical benefits to injured employees when the
employer was attempting to evade liability under the Act.40 The
court stated further that the Workmen's Compensation Act
eliminated the employee's common-law tort action in return for
his right to receive compensation benefits. To allow the em-
ployer to discharge an at-will worker because he applied for
compensation benefits is tantamount to saying to the employee,
"[a]lthough you have no right to a tort action, you have a right
to a workmen's compensation claim which, while it may mean
less money, it is a sure thing. However, if you exercise that right,
we will fire you. '41 Finally, in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,42 the
court pointed out that because many employees faced with the
threat of retaliatory discharge choose to retain their jobs, they
are left, in effect, without either a common-law or statutory rem-
edy. This result relieves employers of their responsibility under
the Act and seriously undermines the whole statutory scheme.43
Plaintiff in Hudson sued only for damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. It is left for future cases to de-
cide whether an employee who has been discharged for an al-
leged retaliatory reason can also bring suit for the independent
tort of "retaliatory discharge." Despite the holding in Raley, the
employee may argue that (1) the supreme court has acknowl-
36. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
37. Id. at 218, 536 P.2d at 515.
38. 284 Or. at 603, 588 P.2d at 1090.
39. 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977).
40. Id. at 1026, 366 N.E.2d at 1148.
41. Id. at 1024, 366 N.E.2d at 1147.
42. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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edged the evolution, since Raley, of exceptions to the termina-
ble-at-will doctrine;"" (2) freedom to contract has long been
subordinate to well-defined public policy in South Carolina;45
and (3) the threat of retaliatory discharge constitutes a prohibi-
tive device by the employer to evade his responsibilities under
the Act.
46
II. STATUTORY EMPLOYER: LIABILITY OF OWNER TO WORKMEN
OF CONTRACTOR
47
In Wilson v. Duke Power Co.,48 the supreme court upheld a
lower court's finding that the owner of a building under con-
struction is not the statutory employer of a contractor's work-
men for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act if the
tasks being performed would not normally be accomplished by
the owner or his employees. 49 This result appears to depart from
earlier interpretations of the South Carolina Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.
Plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries sustained
when contact with a high voltage wire caused him to suffer
burns and to fall seventeen feet from a building under construc-
tion. Defendants were Byars, owner of the building under con-
struction, and Duke Power Company, operator of the transmis-
sion line. Defendant Byars poured a concrete floor for a
structure that encroached upon Duke Power's right of way. In
December, 1975, Duke Power became aware of this encroach-
ment and warned Byars that the building could not be built
safely because of its proximity to high voltage wires. Byars -de-
cided to continue construction and contracted with the Husky
Construction Company for the work. On April 19, 1976, after the
steelwork for the structure had been completed, Husky brought
a crew, which included plaintiff, to install the roof. The accident
occurred shortly thereafter.
Defendant Byars, in part, contended that he was plaintiff's
44. See note 34 supra.
45. See note 34 supra
46. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
47. See generally A. CuSTy, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN SOUTH CARO-
LINA § 3.4.1 (1976).
48. 273 S.C. 610, 258 S.E.2d 101 (1979).
49. Id. at 617, 258 S.E.2d at 104.
228 [Vol. 32
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statutory employer and thus was insulated from tort liability
section 42-1-400 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.50 This
section provides that
[w]hen any person ... undertakes to perform or execute
any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation
and contracts with any other person... for the execution or
performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or
any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the owner
shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work
any compensation under this Title which he would have been
liable to pay if the workman had been immediately employed
by him.51
The purpose of this section is to extend workmen's compensa-
tion benefits to those employees who would not be entitled to
them otherwise and to provide double protection to employees
through both the owner's and the contractor's liability under the
Act.52 The remedy provided in the Act is exclusive, however, and
the injured workman may not maintain a common-law action
against the owner.53 Thus, if the court determined that the work
being done by the Huskey Construction Company was a part of
Byars' general business within the meaning of the section, plain-
tiff-employee would be limited to workmen's compensation
benefits.
The question before the court was whether plaintiff was
performing work that was a part of Byars' "trade, business or
occupation. 5 4 The lower court found that plaintiff was not en-
gaged in such work, because he was not doing work Byars nor-
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-400 (1976).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., MacMullen v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 312 F.2d 662 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 912 (1963); Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Byrd, 238 F.2d
346 (4th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Adams v. Davison-
Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957).
53. See Corollo v. S.S. Kresge Co., 456 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 911
(1972); Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825 (1939); cases cited
note 52 supra.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-400 (1976). For statutory text, see text accompanying
note 51 supra. For cases which have held the employee of a contractor or subcontractor
to be a "statutory employee" engaged in the "trade, business, or occupation" of the own-
er, see, e.g., Hopkins v. Darlington Veneer Co., 208 S.C. 307, 38 S.E.2d 4 (1946); Ken-
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mally would have his own employees do.55 In the lower court's
opinion,
[c]onstruction activity generally can become part of the busi-
ness if the defendant by its size and nature is accustomed to an
ongoing program of construction [and] is equipped, both as to
skilled manpower and tools, to normally handle, such
tasks....
The Defendant Byars had some finishing work in regard to
improving his property but he had never actually erected a
structure.... The Plaintiff was simply not performing tasks
at the time of his accident that the Defendant Byars would
have normally accomplished himself or by his employees. 56
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed summarily, stating only
that "[tihe lower Court properly found that the construction
work being performed was not a part of Byars' trade, business,
or occupation.' ' 57 This view is in accord with that of Professor
Larson,"s but conflicts with recent decisions by the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. In Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative v.
Byrd,59 the cooperative was in the business of supplying electric
power to rural communities. Byrd's immediate employer con-
tracted with the cooperative to construct new electric transmis-
sion and distribution lines and to construct two appurtenant
substations. Byrd argued that, within the meaning of the com-
pensation statute, "construction work is not a part of an owner's
business, unless it is of such a character that ordinarily it would
be performed by his own employees .. ."60 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected this argument as follows:
We do not think that this interpretation of the statute is tena-
ble .... [T]he statute recognizes the practice of letting out to
others the actual performance of one's business and subjects
the owner to liability for compensation to injured workers. The
55. 273 S.C. at 616-17, 258 S.E.2d at 104-05.
56. Record at 588-89.
57. 273 S.C. at 617, 258 S.E.2d at 104-05.
58. See 1C A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 49.12. Professor Larson states that "the test
is not one of whether the subcontractor's activity is useful, necessary, or even absolutely
indispensable to the statutory employer's business. . . . The test . . . is whether this
indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather
than independent contractors." Id. at 9-53.
59. 238 F.2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 525 (1957).
60. Id. at 351.
[Vol. 32
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manifest purpose is to afford the benefits of compensation to
the men who are exposed to the risks of its business, and to
place the burden of paying compensation upon the organizer of
the enterprise.61
In MacMullen v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.6 2 Mac-
Mullen's immediate employer contracted to furnish and install a
coal-handling system as part of the construction of a steam
power generating plant. MacMullen was shocked severely while
attempting to complete alignment for the new equipment. The
district court found that MacMullen's work was part of a very
specialized field and that only four companies in the United
States supply, install, and calibrate coal-weighing equipment.63
Because South Carolina Electric and Gas had neither the facili-
ties nor the personnel to plan and carry out the construction of a
steam-generating plant or a coal-handling system, the district
court found that MacMullen was not performing work that was
a part of the utility's trade, business, or occupation." Quoting
extensively from Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the basic purpose
of the Act was the inclusion of employers and employees, not
their exclusion. In the opinion of the court, holding the Act ap-
plicable only to maintenance and repair, and not to the "more
important field of new construction," defeats this purpose.65
The view taken by the Fourth Circuit is similar to that ex-
pressed by the South Carolina court in Boseman v. Pacific
Mills6" in 1940. In that case, an employee of an independent
61. Id. The court also stated that
it cannot be held that an owner is not obliged to provide compensation for
injuries incurred in the course of construction work performed on his behalf as
part of his business, if he customarily lets the work out to independent con-
tractors and does not perform it himself. It will have been noticed that § 72-
111 of the Act expressly covers an owner who undertakes to perform any work
which is part of his business and contracts with any other person for the execu-
tion "of the whole or any part of the work." Thus, the statute recognizes that
work done at the behest of the owner is owner's work; and unless he is held
liable to pay compensation for injuries incurred in its progress the underlying
purpose of the Act will be frustrated.
Id. at 353 (emphasis original).
62. 312 F.2d 662 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 912 (1963).
63. 205 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.S.C. 1961).
64. Id. at 814.
65. 312 F.2d at 668 (citing Blue Ridge Electric Coop., 238 F.2d at 346).
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contractor was burned to death when the water tank he was
painting caught fire and exploded. The water tank was main-
tained by a cloth manufacturing mill. The mill denied the claim
for workmen's compensation contending that the painting was
not a part of its general business because the work was of such
dangerous and unusual character that it had never been per-
formed by its employees. The work had always been contracted
out to an experienced steeplejack. The supreme court rejected
these arguments and held the mill liable under the Act finding
the tank to be such an integral and necessary part of the cloth
manufacturing business that the painting of the tank consti-
tuted a part of the mill's trade, business, or occupation. Whether
the court intended to establish a new definition of statutory em-
ployer by its affirmance of the lower court order in Wilson is not
made clear by its opinion. The court's decision may have been
influenced by the prospect that a different finding would have
forced substitution of a workmen's compensation claim for a po-
tentially much larger tort claim by the injured worker. Clarifica-
tion of the court's reasoning is left for a later case.
Ill. DISTRIBUTION OF THIRD-PARTY SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS
In Vaughn v. Eddins,6 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that state courts have no authority to vary the statutory
distribution of settlement proceeds from a third-party action,
absent an agreement between the insurance carrier holding a
statutory lien on the proceeds and the employee. Plaintiff's de-
cedent, during the course and within the scope of his employ-
ment with the City of Rock Hill, was killed in an accident
caused by third parties. The city's insurance carrier, the State
Workmen's Compensation Fund (State Fund), admitted liability
and paid benefits totaling $32,910.65 to the employee's benefi-
ciaries. Shortly thereafter, the administrator of the estate
brought a wrongful death action against the third parties result-
ing in a settlement for $60,000. This settlement was reduced to
judgment at trial.
A recovery against third parties after the worker or his de-
pendents have received workmen's compensation benefits is sub-
ject to an insurance carrier's statutory lien
67. 272 S.C. 238, 251 S.E.2d 187 (1979).
232 [Vol. 32
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to the extent of the total amount of compensation, including
medical and other expenses, paid, or to be paid by such carrier,
less the reasonable and necessary expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred in effecting the recovery, and to the extent the
recovery shall be deemed to be for the benefit of the carrier."'
The trial court entered an order recognizing the State Fund's
lien on the settlement proceeds to the extent of the workmen's
compensation benefits paid by the State Fund, but concluded
that the court had the authority to determine the distribution of
those proceeds. The trial court accordingly distributed one-third
of the State Fund's subrogated claim to plaintiff's attorney, one-
third to the State Fund, and one-third to plaintiff's benefi-
ciaries. The State Fund, which was given no notice or opportu-
nity to be heard prior to the order of the lower court, appealed
that portion of the order directing payment to the beneficiaries.
The trial court concluded that, because the settlement with
the third parties occurred during trial, section 42-1-560(e) au-
thorized the court to determine the proper distribution of the
State Fund's subrogated claim. This section states that
[t]he injured employee, or, in event of his death, his de-
pendents, and the carrier may, by agreement approved by the
Industrial Commission, or in event of a settlement made dur-
ing actual trial of the action against the third party, approved
by the presiding judge at the trial, provide for distribution of
the proceeds of any recovery in the action different from that
prescribed by subsection (b) or (c) of this Isection.6 9
The supreme court reversed the lower court's ruling holding
that, although the employee and the carrier may agree to dis-
tribute the amount received from third parties differently from
the method prescribed in section 42-1-560(b), neither the Indus-
trial Commission nor the presiding judge has unilateral author-
ity to vary the distribution of the proceeds absent such an
agreement.
70
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(b) (1976). But see [1977] Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. 320
which states that the third-party lien of a workmen's compensation carrier does not at-
tach to amounts paid to an employee under his uninsured motorist policy.
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-560(e) (1976)(emphasis added).
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IV. ACCIDENTS WHILE GOING TO AND FROM WORK
Plaintiff in Fernander v. Thigpen 1 brought an action for
wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering of plaintiff's
decedent who was involved in an accident while returning home
from work. The lower court granted summary judgment for de-
fendants holding that plaintiff's exclusive remedy was recovery
of workmen's compensation benefits. The supreme court
reversed.
Plaintiff's decedent had been employed on the late shift of a
restaurant in Sumter, South Carolina. On January 16, 1976, af-
ter "punching out" from work at 10:42 p.m., the deceased as-
sisted in the late-night cleanup of the restaurant while awaiting
a ride home with her father. At 2:00 a.m., decedent's father
called the restaurant and spoke with defendant, the assistant
manager.72 According to plaintiff's complaint, defendant, seeing
the decedent still busy with her work, told her father that he,
defendant, would take her home.73 Decedent, acting upon this
direction and agreement, finished her part of the late-night
cleanup and rode home with defendant who, according to the
plaintiff's intestate, was "intending to return. . . [to the restau-
rant] after taking her home." 74Decedent was fatally injured after
defendant lost control of his automobile while approaching her
residence.
Decedent's administratrix, contending that the defendant
was "acting not only for himself but as agent for the corporate
Defendants, ' 75 brought actions alleging negligence against de-
fendant and his employers. The corporate defendants answered
by asserting that, at the time of the accident, neither plaintiff
nor defendant "was working as their agent, servant, or em-
ployee, ' 76 and, alternatively, that if defendant was acting as an
agent or employee, then plaintiff's exclusive remedy was work-
men's compensation benefits.7 7 All defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment upon the latter assertion; they contended that,
71. 273 S.C. 28, 253 S.E.2d 512 (1979).
72. Record at 5-6.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 4-5.
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by her own pleadings, plaintiff admitted that the deceased and
defendant assistant manager were co-employees at the time of
the accident and that defendant was performing work incident
to his employer's business."
To succeed on these motions, corporate defendants had to
establish that the deceased was their employee,79 that they were
subject to the Act,8 0 and that the injury complied with the Act's
definition of that term."' Section 42-5-10, emphasizing the exclu-
sive nature of recovery under the Act, provides that an employer
who elects to come under the Act and "those conducting his bus-
iness," including co-employees,82 shall be liable to injured em-
ployees only to the extent of workmen's compensation benefits
paid or due. 3 An "injury" within the meaning of the Act "shall
78. Record at 64.
79. Before the Workmen's Compensation Act becomes the exclusive remedy, the
employer-employee relationship must exist. This factor is jurisdictional. E.g., Cooper v.
McDevitt & Street Co., 260 S.C. 463, 466, 196 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1973); Chavis v. Watkins,
256 S.C. 30, 30-31, 180 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1971).
The term "employee" is defined in S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (1976 & Cum. Supp.
1979) as "every person engaged in an employment under any ... contract of hire...
express or implied, oral or written, including ... minors." See generally A. CUsTY, supra
note 47, § 3.3. The legislative definition of "employee" was intended to be as broad as
possible. See Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.C. 438, 443, 49 S.E.2d
718, 720 (1948). Specifically excluded from the definition, however, are "workers whose
employment is both casual and not in the course of trade, business, profession, or occu-
pation of his employer." S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130, -360 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
Plaintiff argued in her motion for summary judgment that the deceased was a casual
employee and, thus, was not covered by the Act, but the trial judge found that
"[p]laintiff's own Affidavit together with her Complaints, establish that the deceased's
employment was regular and not casual. . . ." Record at 67-68.
The supreme court noted that the corporate defendants also denied in their answer
that plaintiff was their employee at the time of the accident. 273 S.C. at 30, 253 S.E.2d
at 513. The word "employee," however, as seen above, has a particular statutory mean-
ing. The corporate defendants may have meant by this denial that decedent's death did
not arise out of the scope and within the course of her employment, rather than that
decedent was a casual employee or otherwise did not meet the requirements of S.C. CODE
ANN. § 42-1-130 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
80. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (1976).
81. Id. § 42-1-160.
82. E.g., Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C. 407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1952). See cases cited note 85
infra.
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-5-10 (1976). This section provides that
[e]very employer who accepts the compensation provisions of this Title
shall secure the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner pro-
vided in this chapter. While such security remains in force he or those con-
ducting his business shall only be liable to any employee who elects to come
under this Title for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in
15
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mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
the employment."' 8 Therefore, an employee, who with his em-
ployer, is subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act and
whose injury arises out of and in the course of his employment,
cannot maintain a common-law action against his employer. Nor
can he maintain an action against a co-employee whose alleged
negligence caused the injury if the co-employee was conducting
the employer's business at the time of the accident.8 5
The corporate defendants had to establish their proof from
plaintiff's allegations because they had plead in their answer
that plaintiff was not their employee and that the individual de-
fendant was not conducting their business when the accident oc-
curred. The lower court found that plaintiff's complaint and affi-
davit alleged that she was an employee within the meaning of
the manner specified in this Title.
Id.
The basic exclusive-remedy section of the Act is in § 42-1-540. This section provides
that
[t]he rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he
and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to
pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by acci-
dent, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal
representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at
common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.
Id.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160 (1976). This section provides that
"[l]njury" and "personal injury" shall mean only injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in
any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident
and except such diseases as are compensable under the provisions of Chapter
11 of this Title. In construing this section an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment shall include employment of an employee of a munici-
pality outside the corporate limits of the municipality when the employment
was ordered by a duly authorized employee of the municipality.
Id.
85. Cases discussing co-employee immunity include Burns v. Carolina Power &
Light Co., 193 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 863 (1952); Merritt v.
Smith, 269 S.C. 301, 237 S.E.2d 366 (1977); Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 165 S.E.2d 797
(1969); Powers v. Powers, 239 S.C. 423, 123 S.E.2d 646 (1962); Nolan v. Daley, 222 S.C.
407, 73 S.E.2d 449 (1953).
In Merritt, the court stated that" 'if an employer is within the act to bear its liabili-
ties, he must remain to be accorded its immunities, in the absence of a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary.' Since the co-employee's right of immunity parallels
that of an employer, the same principle applies." 269 S.C. at 306, 237 S.E.2d at 369
(quoting Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 545, 96 S.E.2d 566, 572-73 (1957)).
16
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the Act"6 and that the assistant manager was acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore,
the basic question was whether plaintiff was acting within the
course and scope of her employment.
The general rule in South Carolina is that an employee go-
ing to or from the work place is not engaged in services growing
out of and incidental to his employment, and, therefore, any in-
jury sustained while engaging in such travel does not arise out of
and in the course of employment.17 Since the fatal injury oc-
curred while defendant was taking plaintiff home, it appears
that plaintiff was not covered by the Act. Nevertheless, there
have been numerous cases in South Carolina in which the em-
ployee's travel to and from work has been held to be incidental
to his employment and exceptions to the general rule have
evolved. These exceptions, summarized in Sola v. Sunny Slope
Farms"' include:
(1) Where in going to and returning from work, the means of
transportation is provided by the employer, or the time that is
consumed is paid for or included in the wages; (2) where the
employee, on his way to or from his work, is still charged with
some duty or task in connection with his employment; (3) the
way used is inherently dangerous and is either (a) the exclusive
way of ingress and egress to and from his work; or (b) con-
structed and maintained by the employer; or (4) that such in-
jury incurred by a workman in the course of his travel to his
place of work and not on the premises of his employer but in
86. See note 79 supra.
87. A. CUsTY, supra note 42, § 10.2.1.
Nearly every employee must daily make his way to his employer's place of
business or the place he performs his employer's work and must make his way
home after completing his day's work. During such going to and from work the
risks of accidental injury are not insubstantial, and many employees are in fact
injured during those times. However, the general rule is that an employee go-
ing to or from the place where his work is to be performed is not engaged in
performing any service growing out of and incidental to his employment, and,
therefore, an injury sustained by accident at such time does not arise out of
and in the course of his employment. Thus, the employee does not fall within
the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Id. (footnote omitted). See, e.g., McDaniel v. Bus Terminal Restaurant Management
Corp., 271 S.C. 299, 247 S.E.2d 321 (1978); McDonald v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
223 S.C. 217, 74 S.E.2d 918 (1952); Hinton v. North Ga. Warehouse Corp., 211 S.C. 370,
45 S.E.2d 591 (1947); Eargle v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d
240 (1944).
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close proximity thereto is not compensable unless the place of
injury was brought within the scope of employment by an ex-
press or implied requirement in the contract of employment of
its use by the servant in going to and coming from his work.8 9
The lower court, declaring that plaintiff had alleged in sub-
stance that the assistant manager had promised the decedent a
ride home in return for her help with the late-night cleanup,
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the
exception to the general rule arising when the employer provides
the means of transportation.90 The supreme court, however, not-
89. Id. at 14, 135 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 263,
22 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1942)(emphasis added). See Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S.C.
226, 113 S.E.2d 737 (1960); McDonald v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 223 S.C. 217,
74 S.E.2d 918 (1952); Dicks v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286
(1946); Bailey v. Santee River Hardwood Co., 205 S.C. 433, 32 S.E.2d 365 (1944).
90. Cases applying the "transportation provided by the employer" exception include
Daniels v. Roumillat, 264 S.C. 497, 216 S.E.2d 174 (1975); Baldwin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co., 234 S.C. 320, 108 S.E.2d 409 (1959); Bailey v. Santee River Hardwood Co., 205 S.C.
433, 32 S.E,2d 365 (1944); Ward v. Ocean Forest Club, Inc., 188 S.C. 233, 198 S.E. 385
(1938). Cf. Covington v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 158 S.C. 194, 155 S.E. 438 (1930);
Sanders v. Charleston & W.C. Ry., 97 S.C. 50, 81 S.E. 283 (1913)(exception recognized in
proceedings brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act). The exception has
been quoted with approval in Bickley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 259 S.C. 463,
192 S.E,2d 866 (1972); Fowler v. Abbott Motor Co., 236 S.C. 226, 113 S.E.2d 737 (1960);
McDonald v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 223 S.C. 217, 74 S.E.2d 918-(1952);
Gallman v. Springs Mills, 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715 (1942). In Bailey, the court stated
that "[o]ff-premise injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are com-
pensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or sup-
plied by the employer . . . ." 205 S.C. at 441, 32 S.E.2d at 368 (quoting S. HOROVITZ,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 162 (1944))(emphasis added). In Fowler, the court, explaining
the rationale for the rule, stated:
[i]f the trip to and from work is made in a truck, bus, car or other vehicle
under the control of the employer, an injury during that trip is incurred in the
course of employment. The simple justification for this holding is that the em-
ployer has himself expanded the range of the employment and the attendant
risks.
236 S.C. at 233-34, 113 S.E.2d at 741 (quoting 1 A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 17.10)
(footnote omitted).
Courts in some states have held that the exception applies only when the transpor-
tation is provided by contract or agreement, or when the ride constitutes part of the
employee's compensation. Capozzi v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 784 (E.D.N.Y. 1971);
Belvin v. Cali, 325 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Curry, 28 N.C. App.
286, 221 S.E.2d 75 (1976). Professor Larson, however, states that
the distinction between transportation provided by contract and transporta-
tion provided without agreement or as a courtesy is being increasingly ques-
tioned, since the fundamental reason for extension of liability-the extension
of the actual employer-controlled risks of employment-is not affected by the
question whether the transportation was furnished because of obligation or out
18
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ing that defendant had driven one-half mile directly past plain-
tiff's house when the accident occurred, and that both corporate
defendants had denied that either plaintiff or defendant were
their employees at the time of the accident, declared that
"[w]hether the driver and deceased were in the scope and course
of their employment at the time of the accident is an issue to be
determined at the trial of the case." 91
The supreme court's decision to remand for a jury trial is
understandable. Plaintiff raised questions of fact regarding
whether the deceased was a casual or volunteer employee. Fur-
thermore, even if the death was compensable, a question of fact
was raised about whether individual defendant actually was en
route to the decedent's home at the time of the accident or
whether he had deviated from this route when he drove by her
house without stopping.9 2 Boykin v. Prioleau93 illustrates an em-
ployee's deviation which caused the loss of co-employee immu-
nity. In that case, plaintiff's intestate was employed on the late
shift of a drive-in restaurant in Columbia, South Carolina that
furnished his transportation from work. On December 18, 1966,
he left the drive-in restaurant in his employer's car driven by
defendant, whose duty it was to take plaintiff's intestate and
other employees home. Instead of going directly to the employ-
ees' respective homes, defendant took them on an "extensive joy
ride"94 which included stops at two houses, two nightclubs, and
a restaurant. Upon leaving the restaurant and heading back to
Columbia, an accident occurred killing the decedent and defen-
dant. After settling a workmen's compensation claim from the
decedent's death, decedent's estate commenced a wrongful death
action against defendant's estate. Defendant's administrator as-
serted that a tort action based on the negligence of a co-em-
ployee was barred by what is now section 42-5-10 of the Work-
men's Compensation Act and moved for a directed verdict,
which was subsequently granted. The supreme court reversed,
holding that under that section, a co-employee is not immune
of courtesy.
1 A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 17.30 (footnote omitted).
91. 273 S.C. at 31, 253 S.E.2d at 513.
92. Brief of Appellant at 6-8.
93. 255 S.C. 437, 179 S.E.2d 599 (1971).
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from tort liability "unless at the time of the delict, the employee
• . . [is] performing work incident to the employer's business
. . . ,,"1 The court stated that, since "almost immediately upon
driving away from his employer's place of business"9 6 defendant
abandoned his responsibility and "embarked upon the pursuit of
his own ends, '1 7 he was not conducting his employer's business
within the meaning of the statute. The court believed that the
question of whether he resumed the course and scope of his em-
ployment upon leaving the restaurant and heading back toward
Columbia was at best a jury question and found that the lower
court erred in finding for the defendant as a matter of law.
The similarity between Boykin and Fernander is striking
since defendant in Fernander alleged that plaintiff's decedent
was contributorily negligent in "knowingly and willingly con-
senting to joy ride with defendant" and in "knowingly and will-
ingly continuing to ride with this defendant after she knew or
should have known that he had gone past her home."98 Argua-
bly, therefore, questions of fact were raised in Fernander at
least with regard to individual defendant's liability in torL.
Boykin illustrates the risk to his co-employee immunity that a
negligent employee undertakes when attempting to characterize
plaintiff as contributorily negligent.
Burnet R. Maybank, III
95. Id. at 441, 179 S.E.2d at 600 (quoting Williams v. Bebbington, 247 S.C. 260, 266,
146 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (1966)).
96. 255 S.C. at 441, 179 S.E.2d at 600.
97. Id.
98. Record at 14.
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